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2Motivation
 Financial transactions involve different steps and costs
Trading         clearing  settlement  custody 
 Literature mostly focuses either on 
 “trading” (see e.g. Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2005), De Jong and Rindi (2009)),  or Foucault (2009)),  or 
 “clearing and settlement” (see e.g. Holthausen and Tapking (2007))
 Improved liquidity and “unbundling” makes role of post-trade costs relatively more important?
 This paper links stock market liquidity to post-trade costs
 We study the impact of different pricing schemes of the post-trade 
infrastructure
 Motivated by recent behavior in US and Europe
Trade costs 
(front office)
Post-trade costs 
(back office)
3Motivation: are post-trade 
costs important?
 Issues paper DG Comp European Commission
 See also comparison (May 2010) of LSE-BATS-Chi-X by Oxera
Source graph: Issues Paper, DG COMP European Commission (2006)
4Motivation
 Trades at same quotes should be identical. They are not!
(see also Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2009) on make and take fees)
 Three examples:
 London Stock Exchange started “SETS internalizer” in April 2007. 
 order book executions where both sides of the trade originate from the same investment firm do 
not pass through to clearing and settlement: tariff charged is 87.5% lower than the headline rate
 Euronext introduced algorithm that allows buy and sell orders originating from 
the same investment firm to avoid the cost of clearing and settlement.
 In the US, the DTCC (Depositary Trust and Clearing Corporation) observed 
that an increasing number of investment firms pre-netted their trades => 
clearing and settlement fees were adapted in order to remove pre-netting 
(DTCC (2003)).
5 Oxera report; costs per trade in 2004
Source: white paper Deutsche Börse
(A) Seller and buyer from same bank: bank “internalizes clearing 
and settlement”
“structural” cost per leg normalized to 0 
(B) Seller and buyer from different bank: non-internalized 
settlement (banks require CSD for clearing and settlement)
“structural” marginal cost per leg of the trade c >0
6 Oxera report; costs per trade in 2004
Two brokers i = large, small (market share of traders , 1- ; at both 
buyers and sellers)
(A) Seller and buyer from same broker: price cI (for each leg of the 
transaction)  
(B) Seller and buyer from different broker: price cNI (for each leg of 
the transaction) 
 Pricing schemes of post-trade infrastructure
7Timing of Model
 Before trading starts: 
 Post-trade infrastructure (CSD) announces price according to pricing 
scheme (uniform or trade-specific)
 CSD operates in a perfectly competitive environment => breakeven
pricing
 Buyers and sellers are affiliated to a broker (small or large)
 Trading:
 Each period in time t=0,1,… + ∞, a single trader arrives willing to 
trade one unit of the asset 
 With equal probability it is a buyer or a seller
 Buyer has valuation Vh 
 Seller has valuation Vl  (Vh  > Vl )
 Traders can submit either a market order or limit order; limit order 
remains in book for one period (as in e.g. Foucault (1999), Handa, Schwartz and 
Tiwari (2003), Parlour (1998))
 Limit orders are optimally chosen such that targeted trader type
chooses to go for market order
 Clearing and settlement takes place after each trade (so no intertemporal 
netting)
8Possible “strategies” for limit order traders
 Post-trading costs influence stock market liquidity
 Quotes are not sufficient indicators of liquidity
 Quotes are trader specific
 Higher liquidity may entail lower social welfare
 The pricing schemes of clearing and settlement influence liquidity
 Internalization creates a market when clearing and settlement 
costs are prohibitively high
9Uniform pricing of post-trade
 {all, all} strategy is the only one possible
 Suppose empty limit order book and a buyer arrives: submits a 
bid B such that next arriving seller is indifferent between selling at 
B or submitting a LO herself at A 
 Similarly for a seller arriving
 Resulting in 
10
Uniform pricing of post-trade: 
illustration
 Suppose empty limit order book and a buyer arrives: submits a 
bid B such that next arriving seller is indifferent between selling at 
B or submitting a LO herself at A 
 Similarly for a seller arriving
 Resulting in 
Vh =20; Vl =0; =0.8
Higher « structural » c leads to more liquid quotes
(traders submit a more aggressive LO 
to induce counterparty to submit MO)
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Trade-specific pricing of post-trade
{All, All}
 Buyer of large broker arrives: submits B such that next arriving 
seller of small broker is indifferent between selling at B or 
submitting a LO herself at A addressing all counterparties 
 Similarly for small broker
 Resulting in
Large broker posts less
liquid quotes as outside 
option of small broker is less 
attractive
12
Trade-specific pricing post-trade
{Own, All} 
 Buyer of large broker arrives: submits B such that next arriving 
seller of large broker is indifferent between selling at B or 
submitting a LO that addresses own counterparties only
 Buyer of small broker arrives: keeps arriving seller of large
broker indifferent who addresses own counterparties only
 Resulting in 
Large broker posts less
liquid quotes as small broker 
needs to fully compensate 
large broker for costs
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Trade-specific pricing post-trade
{Own, Own} 
 Buyer of large broker arrives: submits B such that next arriving 
seller of large broker is indifferent between selling at B or 
submitting a LO that addresses own counterparties only
 Buyer of small broker arrives: keeps arriving seller of large
broker indifferent who addresses own counterparties only
 Resulting in 
Large broker posts more
liquid quotes as outside 
option of his own type is 
attractive
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Trade-specific pricing by CSD: 
illustration
All, All Own, All Own, Own
Large 
Small
Vh =20; Vl =0; =0.8
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Social Welfare
 When trading gains are larger than CSD costs => maximize 
probability of trading => {all, all} equilibrium is preferable
 Higher CSD costs lead to higher liquidity but lower social welfare 
=> higher liquidity may not be good indicator of social welfare
 When c is very high, trade-specific (marginal cost based) pricing 
allows to create a market: internalization creates a market 
(without internalization the market would collapse)
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Concluding Remarks
 Post-trading costs as wells as their pricing schemes influence 
stock market liquidity
 Quotes are not sufficient indicators of liquidity
 Quotes are trader specific
 “transaction specific pricing” improves liquidity as long as we have 
{all,all} equilibrium
 Higher liquidity may entail lower social welfare
 Internalization “creates a market” when clearing and settlement 
costs are prohibitively high
